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I.

THIS COURT'S RECENT RULING THAT A PROPERTY OWNER WHO
RETAINS THE RIGHT TO POSSESS HIS PROPERTY CANNOT
CONVEY "EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION" OF THAT PROPERTY FULLY
RESOLVES THIS APPEAL.
Privilege tax is not imposed on "the use or possession of any lease, permit, or

easement unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles the lessjee or permittee to exclusive
possession of the premises to which the lease, permit, or easement relates." Id., § 59-4101(3)(e) (emphasis added). The issue before this Court is whether a property owner can
retain possession of exempt property and simultaneously convey exclusive possession of
that property to a beneficial user of the exempt property.
The district court, on the basis of undisputed facts, helcj that the Navy maintained a
constant presence on the NIROP property, R. 750-751, 1084, &nd employed on-site
personnel whose specific duties were to manage the NIROP facilities and FBM program.
R. 750. It also recognized that ATK had no right to exclude the Navy or anyone
authorized by the Navy from entering NIROP or using NIROP facilities. R. 751 f 17.
The district court concluded that ATK held exclusive possession because "[n]o one else
other than the land owner (Le. the Navy), had any possession, use management, or
control of the NIROP Property during 2000." R. 1090 (emphasis added).
Appellees have not disputed the district court's finding that the Navy retained
possession of NIROP, but have continued to claim that ATK has "exclusive possession"
of NIROP because no one other than ATK and the Navy had possession of NIROP during
2000. Inasmuch as the possession by the Navy is uncontested, the specific issue before
1

this Court is whether the Navy could convey "exclusive possession" of NIROP to ATK
while retaining its own right to possess NIROP. The answer is a resounding no.
In a unanimous decision issued less than two weeks after ATK filed its Opening
Brief in this appeal, this Court addressed that very issue and held that a property owner
who retains possession of his property "could not have granted exclusive possession" to
another party. Osguthorpe v. WolfMountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, 232 P.3d 999
(emphasis added). Osguthorpes were the owners of property leased to Wolf Mountain for
use as a commercial recreational area. The lease agreement did not allow Wolf Mountain
to exclude others from the property and retained Osguthorpes' right to use or possess the
property. It also specified that Wolf Mountain could only erect structures required for a
ski area on that property. This Court held that "the Osguthorpes retained the specific
right to possess the Property," and that "[s]uch an arrangement is not consistent with
conveyance of a possessory interest to Wolf Mountain." Id. at ^f 28. This Court also held
that the Osguthorpes' specifications regarding the way in which Wolf Mountain was
permitted to use the property "limited Wolf Mountain in its use of the land, which is
characteristic of a nonpossessory interest." Id. at ^} 27.
Like the Osguthorpes, the Navy has also imposed limitations on ATK's use of
NIROP which limit ATK's use of the land, rendering it nonpossessory. For example,
"ATK is granted access to, and use of, NIROP to fulfill contracts and subcontracts that
ATK has with the Navy." County's Brief, p. 11 % 17. By those contracts and
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subcontracts, ATK is required to use NIROP in the manufacture of rocket motors for the
Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) programs and other Navy programs. Id., p. 8 <f 9.
The Navy, through the SSP, has direct management responsibility for NIROP and tells
ATK what it can and cannot do with NIROP. R. 83, 625(p. 95:25-956:4), 750 \ 10, 1084,
1090. ATK cannot use NIROP property other than as directed by the Facilities Use
Contract unless it has written permission from the Navy. R. 750 ^ 9. ATK has no
authority to exclude the government or anyone authorized by the government from
entering NIROP or using NIROP facilities. R. 751 f 17.1 Any "unauthorized use of
[NIROP] can subject a person to fine, imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. 641."
County's Brief, p. 12 % 23, R. 725, 250 If 11, 840. As the Osguthorpe Court observed,
specifications such as these, "limited [ATK] in its use of the lind, which is characteristic
of a nonpossessory interest." 2010 UT 29 *[[ 27.
Significantly, the mere retention by the owner of the ri^ht to possess the property
was, in this Court's view, sufficient to defeat a finding of "exdlusive possession":
In granting rights to American Skiing to operate the ski area, the
Osguthorpes specifically retained their rights to continue to use and possess
the Properly. Because the Osguthorpes retained possession, they could not
have granted exclusive possession to American Skiing. In short, neither
Wolf Mountain nor American Skiing has ever been in exclusive possession
of the Property.
1

The County claims that "there would be no reason fot the Navy to block access
to ATK personnel to NIROP." County's Brief, p. 10 f 15. This is unsupported
conjecture and the allegation that "there would be no reason" \o block ATK's access to
NIROP, does not refute the established fact that "[t]he government can refuse to give
permission to ATK to use NIROP property." R. 751116.
3

2010 UT 29 Tf 29. This case directly refutes the district court's decision to disregard the
retained interest of the property owner and the County's claim that the only possible
interpretation of "exclusive possession" is "third party exclusivity or exclusive possession
as to third parties and not as to the exempt property owner." County's Brief, p. 30.
Just as the County has tried to distinguish Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion,
959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998) on the grounds that it was a forcible entry action, ATK
anticipates that the County would likewise urge this Court to disregard Osguthorpe
because it is an unlawful detainer action. In its Opening Brief, ATK explained that the
evaluation of the nature of the interest conveyed to Keller was an essential preliminary
determination which the Court had to make before it could address the forcible entry
claim. The County responded by characterizing "the forcible retainer statute and Utah's
Privilege Tax Act [as] contrasting statutes with absolutely no comparable analysis in
creation, interpretation or application." County's Brief, p. 29. While there are
differences between the statutes, those differences provide no legal basis for taking
disparate approaches to determining the nature of the interest conveyed by a property
owner.
Although Osguthorpe was an unlawful detainer action, this Court held that the
statute could only be applied once the Court determined whether the lease "transferred a
possessory interest in the Property from the Osguthorpes to either Wolf Mountain or
American Skiing." 2010 UT 29 % 24. In determining whether the lease transferred

4

possession of the property, this Court did not rely on law whiqh was unique to unlawful
detainer actions. Instead, it examined general law regarding the conveyance of property
rights such as that found in 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1995) (cited in
Keller, 959 P.2d at 107) and Restatement (First) of Property § 7 (1936). Osguthorpe,
2010 UT 29 TJ 25, 27. The same type of analysis is required ih this case. Before the Court
can determine whether ATK is exempt from privilege tax, it must examine the nature of
the interest conveyed by the Navy. This Court has made it vety clear that when a property
owner "retained possession, they could not have granted exclusive possession."
Osguthorpe, 2010 UT 29 ^ 29. The district court's disregard pf the Navy's continued,
uncontroverted possession of NIROP is reversible error.
Even though ATK believes that Osguthorpe fully resolves this appeal, the
arguments raised by the County in its brief are addressed in the remainder of this Reply
Brief.
II.

THE COUNTY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE HAS NO BASIS
IN LAW.
The County's brief begins with several arguments which are not material to the

issue before this Court. First, the County discusses the legislative purpose underlying the
privilege tax statutes—a purpose which is both undisputed and immaterial.2 Second, the

2

That legislative purpose is neither disputed nor challenged by ATK. However, it
is critical to point out that this Court has held that the "' gap-closing' purpose of the
privilege tax statute" does not justify ignoring plain statutory language. County Bd. of
Equalization v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 927 P.2d 176, 184 (Utah 1996).
5

County discusses the fact that ATK meets the threshold requirements for privilege tax
assessment because it uses exempt property for profitable means—an issue which has
never been in dispute.3 County's Brief, p. 19. The County then devotes a significant
portion of its response to a discussion of Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d
391 (Utah 1964), a case which is wholly inapplicable.4 The County's discussion of the
interpretive issue before this Court is limited to pages 24 to 33 of its Brief wherein it
relies on the erroneous district court decision, two cases, and additional language in the
3

There is no dispute regarding the first two criteria for applying the privilege tax.
The property in question is "exempt" and "is used in connection with a business
conducted for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (2000). The third criteria identified
by the County is "whether an exemption applies." That is precisely the issue before this
Court.
4

The County accuses ATK of "misstating] its relationship with the Government
in its use of NIROP." County's Brief, p. 21. In support of that accusation, the County
relies on Thiokol to assert that "ATK is an independent contractor and not an agent of the
government." County's Brief, p. 22. The County also claims, in a latter section of its
brief, that Thiokol is determinative of the issue in this case. County's Brief, pp. 34-35.
As ATK explained in its Opening Brief, Thiokol is distinguishable because Thiokol
claimed it was acting as an agent for the government and was thus entitled to
governmental immunity from taxation. ATK makes no such claim and has consistently
distinguished this case from Thiokol on those grounds. ATK's Opening Brief, p. 34, n.
11. The County has not challenged those distinctions, but entirely ignores them in its
continued reliance on Thiokol Another critical distinction is that ATK's challenge to the
privilege tax is based on an exemption which was enacted more than twenty years after
the Thiokol decision was issued. This Court has explained that the legislature's
enactment of this exemption reflects its intention to "broaden" the available exemptions
from privilege tax assessments. County Bd. of Equal, 927 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added)
("We note that the Utah legislature apparently intended to also broaden the types of
property exempt from Utah's privilege tax, by exempting . . . any property used pursuant
to a federal grazing lease or permit andfor certain nonexclusive leases, permits, and
easements."). In light of the significant difference in the legal landscape, the Thiokol
decision does not dictate the conclusion in this case.
6

exemption to suggest that "'exclusive possession' under section 59-4-101(3)(e) refers to
third party exclusivity or exclusive possession as to third parties and not as to the exempt
property owner." County's Brief, p. 30 (emphasis by County). Not only does this
interpretation conflict with Osguthorpe, but the County's interpretation of the exemption
violates a cardinal rule of statutory construction which prohibits courts from "inferring]
substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards,
876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994).
First, the County relies on this Court's decision in ABCO Enterprises v. Utah State
Tax Comm yn, 2009 UT 36, 211 P.3d 382, to suggest that, because an exempt property
owner who grants a lease, permit, or easement to that property retains a certain bundle of
rights, the owner's possession must be disregarded in the determination of whether a third
party has "exclusive" possession. In ABCO, the taxpayer was a lessee who fully
possessed the property and did not claim to be exempt under the provision before this
Court. In Osguthorpe this Court recognized that a property owner can fully "transfer[]
possession," of his property, 2010 UT 29 ^ 25, but when that property owner "specifically
retained their rights to continue to use and possess the Property . . . [he] could not have
granted exclusive possession." Id. at ^ 29. Because ABCO was a case in which
possession had been fully transferred, that case does not support the County's
interpretation of the privilege tax exemption.

7

The County also relies on a provision within the exemption, which is only
applicable to lessees or permittees of mineral rights, to suggest that "exclusive
possession" requires the Court to disregard possession by the property owner. That
provision states that "[e]very lessee, permittee, or other holder of a right to remove or
extract the mineral covered by the holder's lease, right, permit, or easement except from
brines of the Great Salt Lake, is considered to be in possession of the premises,
notwithstanding the fact that other parties may have a similar right to remove or extract
another mineral from the same lands or estates." Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e).
According to the County, the "reference to 'other parties' clarifies that 'exclusive
possession' applies to third parties and not to the exempt property owner." County's
Brief, p. 32.
This provision is neither "plain" nor "clarifying." While it does provide that all
lessees, permittees, and easement holders of mining rights have "possession" of the
premises, the language does not define "exclusive" possession. In fact, the word
"exclusive" is not even used in the provision on which the County relies. Furthermore,
because a property owner which leases mineral rights can also retain mining rights for
itself, under the plain language of the provision relied on by the County, such an owner
would "be in possession of the premises" with all other mineral rights holders.5 Thus, the

5

If the County is suggesting that multiple permit holders have "exclusive
possession" then this interpretation is problematic inasmuch as each permittee would then
be assessed a privilege tax on the full value of the exempt property.
8

"other parties" referred to in the language cited by the County | can conceivably include the
property owner. That sentence simply does not provide the "clarification" suggested by
the County. Finally, even if this provision narrowed the scope of the exemption, ATK
would not be effected because ATK is not a "lessee, permittee, or other holder of a right
to remove or extract [minerals]."6
The third basis on which the County relies for its statutory inference is a sheep
grazing case from 1920 in which the issue before the Court was whether the plaintiffs
grazing permit was exclusive. Boley et al v. Butterfield, 194 P. 128 (Utah 1920). In that
case, the property owner had issued a grazing permit to Boley and to another party. Boley
believed he had exclusive grazing rights and sued to enforce t|iose rights. The fact that
the grazing rights had been conferred to a "third party" does hot support the inference of
"third party exclusivity" asserted by the County. Such an inference could only be made if
the property owner had attempted to exercise grazing rights and the Court had concluded
that the owner's possession did not render the grazing permit non-exclusive. The fact that
the Court held that Boley's right was non-exclusive vis-a-vis ft third party does not mean
that a property owner's retained interest is irrelevant to a determination of whether a

6

The County claims that, in 1975, the legislature "narrowed the exclusive
possession exemption by adding this second sentence." County's Brief, p. 31 n. 58.
When that alleged "narrowing" occurred, the exemption only applied to mineral and
grazing leases. In 1987 the exemption was expanded to include all leases, permits, and
easements and this Court has recognized that those 1987 amendments reflect the
Legislature's intent to "broaden the types of property exempt from Utah's privilege tax."
County Bd. of Equal, 927 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).
9

permit conveys "exclusive" possession. This case provides no clarification whatsoever
regarding whether "exclusive" requires a permittee to be able to exclude the property
owner as well as other third parties.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT ATK'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVILEGE TAX EXEMPTION WAS
UNWORKABLE.
The district court held that "the language of the statute contemplates that a person

may have exclusive possession under a lease, a permit, or an easement." R. 1083. The
County claims that if a lease is the only conveyance by which a user can have "exclusive
possession," then ATK's interpretation violates "principles of statutory construction that
each word is used advisedly and effect should be given to each term according to its
ordinary meaning." County's Brief, p. 29. It also states that "if one could never obtain
'exclusive possession' of real property by permit, then reference by section 59-4101(3)(e) to permits is meaningless and inoperable . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). This
argument fails for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that the reference to "lease,
permit, or easement" is contained in the exemption, not the tax imposition statute.
Second, the statutory reference to these different types of conveyances, does not imbue
the written instruments with the legal characteristics they purport to possess. Osguthorpe,
2010 UT 29^26.
The statute which imposes the privilege tax does not provide any characterization
of the type of conveyance which will result in a privilege tax assessment. It simply states:

10

Except as provided in Subsections (l)(b) and (c), a tax \s imposed on the
possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or
personal property which for any reason is exempt from taxation, if that
property is used in connection with a business conducted for profit.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(1). Thus, there is no suggestion that permits and licenses are
inherently subject to privilege tax. In contrast, the exemption at issue contains the only
specific reference to leases, permits, and easements and provides that these conveyances
are exempt "unless the lease, permit, or easement entitles the lessee or permittee to
exclusive possession of the premises to which the lease, permjt, or easement relates."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(e) (emphasis added).
The County claims that the reference to permits and easements in the foregoing
exemption means that such conveyances can transfer "exclusive possession" or they
would not be referenced in the exemption. That is neither an inevitable nor accurate
conclusion. The exemption states that a permit is exempt "unless" the permit conveys
exclusive possession to the permittee. This exemption implicitly recognizes that the mere
characterization of a conveyance as a lease, permit, or easement does not imbue the
conveyance with the legal characteristics inherent in such a conveyance, nor does it
necessarily transfer "exclusive possession." Thus this Court has held that it "is not bound
by the parties' characterization of their transaction or by any title they may have given a
writing." Osguthorpe, 2010 UT 29 f 26, citing Keller, 959 P.Sd at 107. If a permit or
easement conveys exclusive possession, it may, in fact, be a l0ase, and, regardless of how
the document is characterized, it will be subject to privilege tax. On the other hand, a
11

lease which does not vest the beneficial user with exclusive possession against the owner
of the fee may be more properly characterized as a license and is exempt under the
provision before this Court. IdJ
ATK's interpretation of the statute is the only interpretation which gives effect to
the "usual and accepted meaning" of "exclusive possession" as required by law. Gull
Labs, Inc, v. Utah State Tax Comm% 936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Under
the district court and the County's interpretation, a beneficial user will always have
"exclusive possession" despite the degree of control and possession enjoyed by the
property owner. For example, if a permit only entitles a permittee to "possess" the
property three days per week and the owner "possesses" the property the remaining four
days, the district court and the County believe that the beneficial user is subject to a
privilege tax on the full value of the exempt property. The County has not denied that
this is the result of the district court's interpretation.
At the hearing, the Commission conceded the fact that the beneficial user will be
subject to a tax on the full value of the exempt property regardless of the limitations the
owner imposes on the possession of the property:

7

In Osguthorpe, the parties referred to the written instruments as lease
agreements, but the Court found that the agreements did not confer possessory interests.
Even though a lease typically conveys possessory interests, the Court evidently did not
consider it necessary to make any findings regarding the correct legal characterization of
those documents-except to say that it was "not bound by the parties' characterization of
their transaction." 2010 UT 29 ^f 26.
12

Q (The Court): The statement was made that it's either!all or nothing, but if
under the statute we don't do it all or nothing in all the parts that are there,
is all or nothing the only interpretation as far as the tax commission? I
mean do you believe — I mean you said you wanted me to follow the one
case, but is in fact are they doing all or nothing with all — I mean are they
treating leases, permits and easements all — as all or nothing?
A (Mr. McCarrey): Our position would be that it really does end up being
an all or nothing your Honor.
Transcript of Hearing, p. 38:11-20 (Addendum D to County's Brief).
Thus, if the Navy were to issue a permit to a third party to use NIROP for the third
Thursday of every January, under the district court's interpretation, ATK would not have
exclusive possession and would be exempt from privilege tax. The fact that the Navy's
undisputed possession of NIROP does not defeat a finding of ^exclusive possession," but
a more limited possession by a third party would render ATK's possession non-exclusive,
illustrates the problem inherent in the district court's interpretation of the exemption.
There is no dispute that the Navy maintained a constant presence on the NIROP
property, R. 750-751, 1084; it employed on-site personnel wh^se specific duties were to
manage the NIROP facilities and FBM program, R. 750; ATJC had no right to exclude
the Navy or anyone authorized by the Navy from entering NIROP or using NIROP
facilities, R. 751f17; and "[n]o one else other than the land qwner (i.e. the Navy), had
any possession, use management, or control of the NIROP Property during 2000,"
County's Brief, p. 16 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as the Navy "retained possession, [it]

13

could not have granted exclusive possession" of NIROP to ATK. Osguthorpe, 2010 UT
29 \ 29.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT ATK DID NOT
HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT A SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATION.
The district court held that ATK did not have standing because it did not satisfy

the requirements for third-party standing under Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah
1992). In its brief, ATK has explained that Shelledy does not apply because ATK is
asserting standing in its own right. The County seems to miss the point that Shelledy is
inapplicable inasmuch as it appears to attach some significance to the fact that "ATK
doesn't challenge the underlying correctness of Shelledy." County's Brief, p. 35.
Although the County claims that the district court's reliance on Shelledy was
correct, id., it does not respond to ATK's distinction between third party standing and
traditional standing. Instead the County argues that ATK does not have standing because
(a) it allegedly failed to claim economic impact prior to this appeal; and (b) it allegedly
waived the supremacy clause issue after raising it below. The County's response to
ATK's claim that it has standing in its own right under the traditional test for standing is
based on misinterpretations of established Utah Supreme Court precedent and immaterial
factual distinctions.
A.

ATK Satisfied the Traditional Standing Criteria.

Because ATK asserts standing in its own right, the traditional test for standing
applies and ATK need establish only one of the following:
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(1) the interests of the parties are adverse, and the party seeking relief has a
legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) no one has a greater
interest than that party and the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing
is denied; or (3) the issues raised by the party are of great public importance
and ought to be judicially resolved.
State ex rel M. W., 2000 UT 79, 12 P.3d 80, 83, citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51
(Utah 1983)); see also V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 910-11
(Utah 1996) (stating that "a party seeking standing must demonstrate only one of the
[Swan requirements]"). Furthermore, this Court has explained that it is liberal in its
recognition of taxpayer standing. V-l Oil Co., 942 P.2d at 910-11 ("We have liberally
allowed taxpayers to challenge allegedly illegal or unconstitutional expenditures.").
ATK has standing under the traditional standing test. This Court has held that a
party which alleges economic impact as a result of unconstitutional taxation "satisfies the
first step of the standing test." Kennecott, 702 P.2d at 454. It has also recognized that an
underassessment causes the taxing entity to "'suffer some distinct and palpable injury that
gives [it] a personal stake' in the assessed value of state-assessed properties." Id.
Conversely, an overassessment causes direct financial injury to the taxpayer.
The County tries to distinguish County Board of Equalization and Kennecott by
suggesting that this Court's recognition of the County's standing was based on the
County's "constitutional duty to assure that properties are taxed uniformly and equally."
This was not the Court's holding. In County Board of Equalization (the "Evans and
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Sutherland" case),8 the County claimed that a particular privilege tax exemption
unconstitutionally discriminated against the federal government and against nonprofit,
private educational organizations. The Court held that the County had standing to assert
constitutional violations because its "'budgeting and taxing functions'" were directly
affected. 927 P.2d 176, 181, citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451,
454-455 (Utah 1985).
In Kennecott, the Court observed that underassessment "could well prevent the
County from raising adequate revenues to perform its statutorily established
responsibilities." 702 P.2d 451, 454 (emphasis added). In County Board of Equalization,
this Court cited Kennecott as support for its standing determination specifically because it
recognized the direct financial impact taxing decisions have on "the counties' budgeting
and taxing functions." 927 P.2d at 181.9
8

The County suggests that the issue of economic impact was not properly raised
because ATK's reference to "Evans & Sutherland" at the hearing misled the Court.
County's Brief, p. 36 n. 73. Contrary to the County's representation, counsel for ATK
correctly identified the case as "County Board of Equalization, the Evans Sutherland case
that's cited to you." Transcript of Hearing, p. 19:14-15. Because there were two Co unty
Board of Equalization cases, ATK attempted to provide clarification by referring to the
case as "the Evans & Sutherland case." However, because there was another Evans &
Sutherland case which had been identified in the briefing to the district court, the court
did not review the County Board of Equalization case when it issued its decision on
standing. There is no question that the district court was confused by counsel's reference
to that case as "Evans & Sutherland," but that confusion is no justification for ignoring
the precedent established by that case.
9

In Kennecott, this Court recognized that the second step of the standing test was
also satisfied because, "[i]f counties do not have standing to challenge underassessments
of state-assessed properties, then underassessments could be effectively insulated from
16

The County also tries to distinguish California Pharmacists Ass 'n v. MaxwellJolley, 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009), but does not rebut the principle for which that case
has been cited. In that case, the court recognized that the plaintiffs had standing to assert
a violation of the Supremacy Clause because the allegedly unconstitutional statute would
economically impact the plaintiffs. It held that "[a] cause of action based on the
Supremacy Clause obviates the need for reliance on third-party rights because the cause
of action is one to enforce the proper constitutional structural relationship between the
state and federal governments and therefore is not rights-based." Id. at 851. The County
claims this case is inapplicable because the issue in that case was not one of taxation and
because the parties sought declarative and injunctive relief. These are immaterial
distinctions.10 ATK cited this case to establish that third-party rights were not implicated
by its challenge to the constitutionality of the district court's interpretation of the privilege
tax statute. The case stands for the principle that "everyone has a personal right,
independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of a constitutionally
invalid statute against her." "As Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party

challenges." Id. at 455. This test is also met in this appeal. If this Court held that ATK
does not have standing to challenge the privilege tax assessment, then the overassessment
would be "insulated from challenges" because the federal government is not required to
pay the privilege tax and has no incentive to challenge the assessment.
10

The County characterizes this appeal as "involving] the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity" and attempts to distinguish California Pharmacists Ass yn
on that basis. However, ATK has never based its Supremacy Clause argument on a claim
of intergovernmental immunity. ATK is not a government agency, nor does it claim to be
an agent of the federal government. See ATK's Opening Brief, p. 34 n. 11.
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Standing^ 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1327 (2000). The County's identification of
immaterial factual distinctions does not effectively rebut the principle for which this case
stands. Under traditional standing criteria, ATK has the right to assert a Supremacy
Clause violation.
B.

The Economic Impact of Allegedly Unconstitutional Taxation Is Not a
New Issue in this Case.

According to the County, ATK did not allege "economic impact" until this appeal
and "[f|ailure to raise [economic impact] precludes their consideration by the Court." Id.
The County's claim that ATK did not allege "economic impact" until this appeal defies
logic. An allegation of "economic impact" is implicit in any claim of unconstitutional
taxation. Throughout these proceedings, ATK has continually asserted its own right to be
free from unconstitutional taxation which, by its very nature, has an economic impact on
ATK.11
In this case, ATK has challenged the district court's legal conclusion that it does
not have standing under third-party standing rules. The fact that the district court

11

The issue of whether ATK had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
privilege tax assessment was raised by the County in its response to ATK's motion for
summary judgment. The County relied on Shelledy, a third party standing case, to assert
that ATK did not have standing to raise a constitutional challenge. In response, ATK
stated that "[t]he County's assertion that 'ATK asserts a third party claim on behalf of the
United States,' is patently false." R. 1074, n. 3. ATK explained that it was not
"asserting] a claim on behalf of the Navy," but was asserting its own right to be free
from unconstitutional taxation. R. 1074 (emphasis added). Even if ATK did not use the
specific phrase "economic impact," such an impact is implicit in any taxpayer's claim of
unconstitutional taxation.
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addressed and decided this issue conclusively demonstrates the issue of standing was not
raised "for the first time on appeal." County's Brief, p. 36. Moreover, inasmuch as this
Court has recognized a defendant's right to raise standing for the first time on appeal,
Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 21, 207 P.3d 1221, 1223-24, it follows that a
party claiming standing should not be barred from challenging a court's legal decision on
standing on all available bases. The County's effort to foreclose ATK's ability to
challenge the district court's decision by suggesting it is precluded from asserting
economic impact should not be seriously entertained. The law does not require parties to
anticipate and respond to arguments made by an opposing party or decisions by a judicial
body before those arguments are made or decisions are issued.12
By virtue of the fact that ATK is a taxpayer and was appealing an alleged
overassessment, there is no question that ATK was asserting economic impact. Under
this Court's ruling in Kennecott, such an impact satisfied traditional standing criteria.

12

The County cites Ong International (USA), Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp,, 850 P.2d
447 (Utah 1993), as support for its claim that "[t]he issue of economic impact and
argument under the Doctrine of Pre-emption cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal." County's Brief, p. 36. This is a mischaracterization of that case. The issues
before the Ong Court included whether the defendants could appeal the trial court's jury
instruction which had not been challenged on the trial court level, and whether they could
withdraw their own concession that the plaintiffs claims arose before a statute allowing
treble damages went into effect. The Court refused to allow the defendants to raise these
new arguments on appeal.
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C.

ATK Has Not Waived Standing or its Supremacy Clause Argument

The County also defends the district court's standing decision on the grounds that
ATK has allegedly waived its Supremacy Clause argument. The County improperly
raises this argument as support for the district court's decision even though the district
court did not conclude that waiver had occurred. Indeed, the discussion which the County
has characterized as the waiver, was nothing of the sort. During the hearing, counsel for
ATK acknowledged that the Supremacy Clause is designed to protect the federal
government. This acknowledgment was not a waiver of ATK's right to challenge the
unconstitutionality of the privilege tax assessment. ATK has continued to assert its own
right to be free from unconstitutional taxation and bases the claim of unconstitutionality
on the fact that the assessment on the full value of NIROP includes the value of the
Navy's retained interest in NIROP in violation of the Supremacy Clause. If ATK had
truly waived the Supremacy Clause argument, then the issue of standing would be moot.
ATK's right to be free from an unconstitutional overassessment is in no way
inferior to the County's right to challenge allegedly unconstitutional underassessments.
Economic consequences flow from either type of assessment and, under this Court's
decisions in County Bd. of Equalization and Kennecott, such consequences are an
adequate basis for standing. See also V-l Oil Co., 942 P.2d at 910-L
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V.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
TAX EXEMPTION VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE,
ATK has argued that the privilege tax assessment violates the Supremacy Clause

because it taxes the full value of NIROP even though ATK does not have exclusive
possession of that property. Consequently some portion of the privilege tax is attributable
to the federal government's retained interest in NIROP, which interest is not subject to
tax under the Supremacy Clause. Inasmuch as "everyone has a personal right,
independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of a constitutionally
invalid statute against her," 113 Harv. L. Rev. at 1327, ATK has challenged the
enforcement of the privilege tax assessment as violative of the Supremacy Clause.
The County defends the constitutionality of the assessment on the basis that "[t]he
Government's immunity does not shield private parties with whom it does business from
state taxes.'" County's Brief, p. 39, quoting United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720,
733 (1982). However, ATK does not claim to be immune from privilege tax. This fact
should have been clear from ATK's discussion of Thiokol wherein it explained that ATK
"does not claim to be an agent of the United States." ATK's Opening Brief, p. 34 n. 11.
Notwithstanding that fact, the County claims "that ATK is arguing for immunity." Id. at
40 n. 84. ATK has never suggested that Utah or any other state does not have a right to
assess a privilege tax for the beneficial use of exempt property. Accordingly, there is no
disagreement between the parties with the Supreme Court's declaration that governmental
immunity "does not shield private parties with whom [the government] does business."
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U.S. v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 489 (1958). However, a tax on the use of property is
"valid only to the extent that it reaches the contractor's interest in Government-owned
property." New Mexico, 455 U.S. at 741 n. 14. Utah's privilege tax statute comports with
constitutional requirements if the privilege tax exemption at issue in this appeal is
interpreted to prohibit a privilege tax assessment when the permittee does not have
"exclusive possession" of the property vis a vis the property owner or any other party.
However, if the exemption is interpreted to require an assessment on the full value of
NIROP, even though the federal government retains some possession of that property,
then the assessment violates the Supremacy Clause by taxing the federal government's
retained interest in that property—even though the tax is assessed to the user of that
property and not the federal government.
In support of its claim that the district court's interpretation of the privilege tax
exemption violated the Supremacy Clause, ATK relied on several cases, including United
States v. Nye County, 178 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 503 U.S. 919.13 The
County attempts to distinguish Nye County, 178 F.2d 1040, by characterizing the
privilege tax as "a tax measure levied on the property itself." County's Brief, p. 41. This
characterization of the offending tax in Nye County ignores the fact that the court
characterized the tax assessed by Nye County as "an ad valorem tax on property of the
United States" because:

13

See discussion and cases cited in ATK's Opening Brief, pp. 34-40.
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Areata has no leasehold interest in [the property], but merely has the
privilege terminable at the will of the government, to use the property at the
time and place and in the manner directed by the United States. Nye
County makes no attempt to segregate and tax any possessory interest
Areata may have in the property, or Arcata's beneficial use of the property.
Id. at 1043. The County's attempt to distinguish Nye County on the basis of the court's
characterization of the tax as "an ad valorem tax on property of the United States,"
ignores the fact that the court made this comparison precisely because the tax was not
limited to the value of "a lessee's possessory interest in, or a user's beneficial use of,
property owned by the United States." Id. The tax assessed by Nye County was
substantively identical to the tax assessed against ATK inasmuch as both taxes are
assessed against the beneficial user of the property "'in the same amount and to the same
extent as though the lessee or user were the owner of the property.'" 938 F.2d at 1043,
quoting Nev. Rev. Stat § 361.159.
The County then erroneously asserts that the Ninth Circuit approved a tax similar
to Utah's privilege tax in United States v. County of San Diego, 965 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.
1992), when, in fact, the Ninth Circuit decision actually supports the position taken by
ATK. County's Brief, p. 42. In San Diego, the contractor was assessed a tax based on
the value of its possessory interest in federally owned property. In upholding the
assessment, the court distinguished the statute from the one at issue in Nye County by
explaining that the Nevada statute "made 'no attempt to segregate and tax any possessory
interest [the contractor] may have in the property,'" whereas the California statute "taxes

23

only [the contractor's] possessory use interest in the device, and not the underlying value
of the device itself." 965 F.2d at 694.
While there are factual distinctions between this appeal and the facts in United
States v. Colorado, 460 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Colo. 1978) affd, 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir.
1980) affdsub nom,, Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981), those
distinctions do not invalidate the court's holding that a tax on the full value of exempt
property which does not "account[] for any of the imposed limitations on [the permittee's]
use of the property... subjected the property and the activities of the Federal
Government to state and local taxation and thereby infringed upon the immunity of the
United States from the imposition of taxes upon its own property." Id, (emphasis added).
The degree to which the contractor's use of the property was limited by the federal
government will be unique in every case. In this case, the district court found that the
Navy maintained a constant presence on NIROP. R. 1084. It also found that the Navy
retained management and control of NIROP. Id,
A central premise of statutory interpretation is that "every effort should be made to
interpret [statutes] as being consistent with the dictates of the constitution." Logan v.
Utah Power & Light Co,, 796 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1990); see also Due South Inc. v.
Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 2008 UT 71 f 39 ("We will construe a statute as
constitutional wherever possible, resolving any reasonable doubt in favor of
constitutionality.") If the statue is interpreted to require the imposition of privilege tax on
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the beneficial use of exempt property, even though the beneficial user does not have full,
unfettered use of the property, then the failure to "account[] for any of the imposed
limitations on [ATK's] use of the property . . . subjects] the property and activities of the
[Navy] to state and local taxation and thereby infringe[s] upon the immunity of the United
States from the imposition of taxes on its own properly." Colorado, 460 F. Supp. at 1189.
The inclusion of the "exclusive possession" requirement preserves the constitutionality of
Utah's privilege tax state by insuring that the government's retained interest in the
property is not subject to tax.
CONCLUSION
ATK respectfully requests this Court to find that the district court erred when it
concluded that ATK has "exclusive possession" of NIROP even though the Navy retains
possession and control of that property. If the Court affirms the district court's
interpretation of the statute, then ATK requests this Court to find that (a) the economic
impact of the privilege tax on ATK gives it standing to raise a Supremacy Clause
challenge, and (b) the assessment of privilege tax on the full value of NIROP violates the
Supremacy Clause by taxing the Navy's retained interest in and possession of NIROP.
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